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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
All determinative statutes were set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant. 
OVERVIEW 
The legal principles relating to a governmental entity's duty 
with respect to roads and streets are complex and a precise 
identification of the issues is necessary. For example, in this 
case, the Plaintiff has alleged that Utah County failed to warn of 
the dangerous Intersection. 
Utah County counters this contention by arguing that it did 
not have a duty to install warning signs. Instead, Utah County 
argues that its only duty is that once it decides to install 
warning signs, it must do so in a non-negligent manner. This is 
based on this Court's holding in Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 
556 (Utah App. 1992), where this Court held: 
Rather than placing a duty on municipality to erect 
traffic control devices, the common law requires only 
that once the municipality takes action to install such 
devices, it must do so in a non-negligent manner. 
Id. at 566. 
However, these principles apply only to traffic control 
devises at intersections. They do not state a municipality's duty 
to warn. The Supreme Court of Florida captured this essential 
distinction in Department of Trans, v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 
(Fla. 1982). There, the plaintiff's alleged that the State failed 
to install traffic control devices at an intersection and failed to 
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warn. With respect to the duty to install traffic control devises, 
the Supreme Court of Florida stated: 
In our view, decisions relating to the installation of 
appropriate traffic control methods and devices or the 
establishment of speed limits are discretionary decisions 
which implement the entity's police power and are 
judgmental, planning level functions. 
Id. at 1077. However, with respect to the duty to warn of the same 
Intersection, the Supreme Court of Florida held: 
The failure to so warn of a known danger is, in our view, 
a negligent omission at the operational level of 
government and cannot reasonably be argued to be within 
the judgmental, planning-level sphere. Clearly, this 
type of failure may serve as the basis or an action 
against the governmental entity. 
Id. at 1078. 
Utah County had discretion to install traffic control devices 
at the intersection. But it did not have discretion to warn. It 
must warn. Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the distinction 
between traffic control devices and warning signs is critical to 
the resolution of this case. Those authorities relating to the 
duty to warn clearly indicate a duty on the part of Utah County to 
warn of the dangerous Intersection. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH COUNTY HAD A COMMON LAW DUTY TO WARN MOTORISTS OF 
THE DANGEROUS INTERSECTION, 
Utah County argues that based on previous holdings of the Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court, it had no duty to warn motorists 
using 6000 West of the dangerous Intersection. Stevens v. Salt Lake 
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County. 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970); Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 
556 (Utah App. 1992). However, neither of these cases dealt with 
the duty to warn motorists and, therefore, neither is applicable 
here to shield Utah County from liability for its negligent 
actions. 
Stevens dealt with an intersection between a dirt path on a 
vacant lot and a mainstream road. The plaintiff alleged that 
motorists using the dirt path and motorists using the road could 
not see each other in time to avoid accidents. The plaintiff in 
Stevens was asking Salt Lake County to "correct" or "remedy" the 
hazard. Stevens, 478 P.2d at 499. Utah County proceeds to argue 
that because a county has no duty to correct visibility problems 
between dirt paths and main roads, it has no duty to warn motorists 
of dangerous conditions caused by the intersection between two main 
roads. 
The Plaintiff in this case has not asked Utah County to 
"correct" or "remedy" the hazard. Instead, the Plaintiff has 
alleged that Utah County should have "warned" of the hazard. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Stevens never addressed the issue of warning 
and therefore, that case cannot be used to support Utah County's 
contention that it had no duty to warn of the site distance problem 
at the Intersection. 
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Utah County also relies upon this Court's holding in Jones v. 
Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The holding of 
Jones was that "[rjather than placing a duty on a municipality to 
erect traffic control devices, the common law requires only that 
once the municipality takes action to install such devices, it must 
do so in a non-negligent manner." Jones, 834 P.2d at 560. Utah 
County extrapolates this holding to suggest that it has no duty to 
warn motorists of dangerous and defective conditions in its roads 
unless it so chooses in the exercise of its "discretion." Jones 
dealt with the narrow issue of whether a municipality had a duty to 
place traffic control devices at an intersection. Jones did not 
address the duty of a municipality to warn of dangerous conditions, 
and, therefore, is inapplicable here. 
Moreover, Utah County's interpretation is inconsistent with 
the authorities used to support Jones. This Court relied upon 
McQuillin and his statement that "a city is generally not liable 
for failure to install traffic signs and signals." 19 Eugene 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 54.28b, at 90 (3d 
ed. 1985) . However, this statements addressed only the duty to 
place traffic control devices at intersections. Now let's see what 
McQuillin had to say about the duty to warn, which is the subject 
of this case: 
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The absence of a sufficient barrier, guard, railing, 
light, sign, or the like in a public way, for the 
protection of travelers using due care who are endangered 
by the want of such precautions, constitutes a defect and 
a want of repair. Accordingly, in addition to the duty to 
repair, the duty of a municipality to use ordinary care 
to keep its streets in condition for use includes the 
duty, where there are dangerous obstructions, 
declivities, or excavations on or near the street, 
whether created by the municipality itself or by third 
persons, where it has notice thereof or notice is 
unnecessary, to take proper precautions to guard against 
accidents by the use of railings, barriers, lights, or 
the like, especially at night. 
18 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 54.90a, 
at pp. 334-35 (emphasis added). See also 39 Am.Jur.2d, Highways. 
Streets, and Bridges, § 397 (1968); Annotation, Highways; 
Governmental Duty to Provide Curve Warnings or Markings. 57 
A.L.R.4th 342 (1987). 
Utah County relies upon only selective portions of McQuillin 
to support its argument. It ignores those sections which directly 
relate to the duty to warn, sections which clearly indicate that 
Utah County had a duty here to warn of the dangerous Intersection. 
Utah County has not provided a single case which indicates 
that a county has discretion to warn motorists. Stevens related to 
the duty to a municipality to "correct" or "remedy" hazards 
alongside the road. Jones dealt with the duty to erect traffic 
control devices at an intersection. There is absolutely no support 
for the contention that Utah County can choose to warn motorists of 
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dangerous and defective conditions in its roads and streets, or at 
its option subject motorists to peril. 
Utah County accuses Plaintiff of using the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985), 
to support those sections of McQuillin's treatise up on which she 
relies. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Richards that: 
The duty of municipal corporations with respect to the 
maintenance and repair of traffic signals in this state 
is set out in 18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 53.42 (3d ed. 1984). 
Id. at 278. Utah County seems to argue that Richards can only be 
used as precedent to support Section 53.42. However, this Court in 
Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), used the 
very same language which Plaintiff used in her brief to support the 
use of section 54.28 of McQuillin's treatise. Id. at 560 n.l.1 Utah 
County has not been quick to attack the Jones case because it 
desperately relies upon that case to support its position, but 
attacks the Plaintiff for following the lead of this Court. Utah 
County's argument that McQuillin is the law of Utah only when it 
supports its position is misplaced, patently unfair, and should be 
summarily rejected. 
1
 Utah County compares the quotation from Plaintiff's brief 
with the quotation from Richards and suggests that Plaintiff 
intentionally misquoted the language by deleting the section from 
McQuillin referred to by the Court in Richards. However, this Court 
in Jones quoted the Supreme Court in exactly the same manner as 
Plaintiff did, also deleting the section number. 
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Utah County dismisses Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm'n. 465 
P.2d 534 (Utah 1970), and Carroll v. State Road Comm'n. 496 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1972), on the grounds that in both instances, the State 
Road Commission had placed warning signs or barriers, but the means 
of warning were deficient. Utah County then argues that in neither 
case did the Utah Supreme Court hold that a municipality had a duty 
to warn. But consider closely the language of Bramel: 
The answer to the first proposition is to be found in 
applying the test found so generally throughout the law 
of torts, and which is also applicable here: Did the 
defendant Road Commission discharge its duty of 
exercising reasonable care under the circumstances by 
placing adequate and appropriate warning signs for the 
safety of traffic using the highway. 
Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 465 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 
1970) (emphasis added) . The Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the 
Road Commission only had a duty of "placing adequate and 
appropriate" warning signs at its discretion. Instead, it held the 
Road Commission had a duty to place warning signs. This was also 
the conclusion reached by the Utah Supreme Court in Carroll v. 
State Road Comm'n. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). Justice Ellett stated 
the point most clearly, concurring in Carroll: 
In this case there was no place for discretion to give or 
not to give an adequate warning to the motoring public. 
The duty on the part of the State to give and maintain a 
reasonably adequate warning was absolute, and I am unable 
to see where discretion is involved. 
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Carroll, 496 P.2d at 892 (J. Ellett, concurring)(emphasis added). 
(The majority in Carroll also held that the decision as to how to 
warn did not involve discretion.) These cases demonstrate that once 
the duty to warn is addressed instead of issues surrounding 
intersections signs, Utah County's argument crumbles. 
Utah County has never provided any public policy or other 
rationale for its contention that it has discretion to warn 
motorists of dangers on its roads. Utah County concedes that it 
has a duty to "maintain its county roads in a condition reasonably 
safe for travel." Brief of Appellee, p. 11. However, Utah County 
then proceeds to argue that it can, at its option, decide whether 
it would like to fulfill that duty by warning people of dangers. In 
other words, although 6000 West is not reasonably safe for travel 
due to the perilous sight distance problem, Utah County argues that 
it could chose whether or not to make the road reasonable safe for 
travel. 
This theory represents a radical departure from traditional 
case law. Ordinarily, if one has a duty, he or she must take steps 
to fulfill that duty or he or she will be found negligent. Utah 
County wants a separate set of rules to be applied only to Utah 
County. Under these rules, Utah County has a duty to maintain its 
roads in a condition reasonably safe for travel, but can chose 
whether or not it wants to take steps to fulfill that duty. If Utah 
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County chooses to fulfill the duty, all the better. However, if 
Utah County decides at its option that it does not want to fulfill 
the duty, then motorists are left without a remedy. Plaintiff has 
been unable to find one single case which suggests that a tort-
feasor has the option of choosing whether to fulfill a legal duty 
clearly established. 
There is a complete absence of support for Utah County's 
contention that it had no duty to warn of the dangerous 
Intersection. Every authority addressing the issue has held that 
there is such a duty. The basis for these decisions is that a 
county has a duty to maintain its streets and roads in a condition 
reasonably safe for travel, and this duty cannot be fulfilled if 
motorists are not warned of dangerous perils on the road. Utah 
County is forced to use cases dealing with the control of 
intersections to support its position. These cases should not take 
precedence over the Utah Supreme Court's clearly stated principle 
that counties must fulfill their duty to keep their roads in a 
condition reasonably safe for travel "by placing adequate and 
appropriate warning signs for the safety of traffic using the 
highways." Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 465 P. 2d 534 (Utah 
1970). 
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II. 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-6-22 (1988) REQUIRED UTAH COUNTY TO 
WARN OF THE DANGEROUS INTERSECTION. 
Utah County argues that Plaintiff cannot assert Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-22 (1988) as a ground for relief because the issue was not 
raised before the trial court. However, in Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Associates. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988), the appellants contended that 
the appellee should not be allowed to raise on appeal that a 
contractual provision applied because the matter was not raised 
before the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
Appellants rely upon Banaerter v. Poulton in support of 
their argument that Home is precluded from claiming for 
the first time on appeal that paragraph 9 did not impose 
a bonding requirement on the bank. But application of 
this principle in no sense forecloses application of all 
other rules of appellate review. One such principle is 
that we may affirm trial court decisions on any proper 
ground(s), despite the trial court having assigned 
another reason for its ruling. In this case, we view the 
trial court as having erred in construing the parties1 
agreement However, as explained below, we conclude that 
paragraph 9 did not impose a duty on Home, and therefore 
we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Home. 
Id. at 894-95. The same case law which Utah County advances in 
asking this Court to consider its causation and reasonableness 
arguments also allows this Court to consider Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
22 (1988). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988) provides: 
Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, 
shall place and maintain official traffic-control devices 
upon highways under their jurisdiction as they find 
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necessary to indicate and carry out the provisions of 
this chapter or local traffic ordinances, or to regulate, 
warn or guide traffic. 
Id. Utah County naturally places total reliance on the "as they 
find necessary" language. Plaintiff submits that this language does 
not confer discretion upon the county to warn. Utah County has 
still never explained why it has discretion to warn about dangerous 
conditions which render its road and streets not reasonably safe 
for travel. If there is a dangerous condition in the road, Utah 
County must warn or correct the remedy. Utah County should not be 
allowed to argue that it has an option to fulfill its legal duty of 
maintaining its streets and roads in a condition reasonably safe 
for travel. 
III. 
UTAH COUNTY'S OWN STANDARD REQUIRED IT TO WARN. 
Utah County argues that Plaintiff should not be allowed to 
argue that Utah County1s own standards required it to warn because 
the argument was not presented to the trial court. This position is 
inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's stated principles. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). 
The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices which Utah 
County has accepted as its standard mandates that lf[s]igns are 
essential where special regulations apply at specific places or at 
specific times only, or where hazards are not self-evident." Manual 
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on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, § 2A-1 
(1988). There is no discretion to warn. Utah County has a duty to 
warn anytime there is a condition which renders the road unsafe for 
travel. This Manual certainly does not relieve Utah County of its 
common law duty to warn. 
IV. 
UTAH COUNTY BREACHED ITS DUTY TO WARN IN THAT IT KNEW OR 
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE HAZARD, BUT FAILED TO REMEDY IT 
OR WARN MOTORISTS OF THE DANGEROUS INTERSECTION. 
Utah Court argues that summary judgment is appropriate on the 
issue of whether Utah County breached its duty of care. This Court 
has set forth guiding principles for the granting of summary 
judgment in negligence cases. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 
780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989). This Court has stated: 
As a general proposition, summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its 
merits, and should be employed "only in the most clear 
cut case." . . . Of particular concern is the precept 
that "[olrdinarilv, whether a defendant has breached the 
required standard of care is a question of fact for the 
jury." . . . Accordingly, summary judgment is 
inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is 
"fixed by law," and reasonable minds could reach but one 
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the 
circumstances. 
Id. (emphasis added) Utah County is not entitled to summary 
judgment on the grounds that it did not breach its duty owed to 
Plaintiff. 
12 
Utah County argues that its actions were reasonable as a 
matter of law because it did not know of the dangerous 
Intersection. This argument is based on two principles. First, Utah 
County argues that it relied upon municipalities to insure that new 
intersections are safely attached to county roads. Second, it 
argues that it relied upon "accident reports, input from schools, 
school administrators, bus drivers, police officers, Utah 
Department of Transportation officials and municipalities" to 
inform it of dangerous conditions on its roads. 
The fundamental problem with this argument is that the 
municipalities, school administrators, bus drivers and Department 
of Transportation officials are not responsible to insure 6000 West 
is in a condition reasonably safe for travel. Utah County has that 
duty. Utah County has not presented any case support for its 
contention that it can delegate its duty to maintain its streets 
and roads. The mere fact that these sources did not discover the 
dangerous Intersection does not relieve Utah County of its duty. 
Furthermore, only a jury can decide whether it was reasonable for 
Utah County to rely upon these sources to fulfill its duty. 
Moreover, it is axiomatic that this Court considers all the 
evidence and inferences stemming therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, in this case Plaintiff. Wycalis v. 
Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah 1989). Here, the 
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evidence is that Utah County employed a full time road inspector 
that inspects all roads each year. R. 520 (Affidavit of Paul 
Hawker, f 5). 11500 North was connected to 6000 West in the early 
1980 fs. R. 347. This accident occurred on January 18, 1990. R. 165. 
Thus, Utah County's road inspector would have driven over this 
portion of road five to eight times prior to the accident. 
Moreover, Officer Kerry Evans testified: 
The intersection at 6000 West 11500 North is a poorly 
designed one in my opinion. The north bo[und] traffic and 
the west bound traffic cannot see each other until the 
No[rth] Bo[und] vehicle crests the hill. The absence of 
ski marks of both vehicles in this accident shows this. 
R. 597. A jury would not only be justified in finding that Utah 
County should have known of this hazard, it might be unjustified in 
finding otherwise. Summary judgment should not be granted on the 
issue of whether Utah County breached its duty to Plaintiff. 
V. 
UTAH COUNTY BREACHED ITS DUTY BY FAILING TO CONDUCT A 
TRAFFIC AND ENGINEERING STUDY PRIOR TO REDUCING THE SPEED 
LIMIT ALONG 6000 WEST. 
Plaintiff argued before the trial court that Utah County was 
per se negligent in that it failed to conduct a traffic and 
engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit along 6000 West 
from 55 miles per hour. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1988). Utah 
County details the argument which led to this conclusion and 
dismisses it as "rank speculation." Brief of Appellee, pp. 25-26. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated principles by which 
an expert witness1s affidavit can be used to avoid summary 
judgment. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Nay v. 
General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993). In Nav, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
In Butterfield. we held that an expert witness can defeat 
summary judgment by expressing conclusions as to the 
dispositive issues before the finder of fact and by 
identifying the specific grounds upon which his or her 
conclusions are based. Id. at 104. Only when the expert 
states a conclusion without identifying supporting facts 
will summary judgment be appropriate Here, the Nays1 
expert witnesses met the Butterfield standard. Taken 
together, their testimony establishes a complete, 
specific theory of both defect and causation. 
Nav. 850 P.2d at 1264. 
Here, Plaintiff presented the testimony of C. Arthur Guerts, 
who testified as follows: 
7. I have concluded that under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
46(2) (c) (1988), the prima facie speed limit under Utah 
law for 6000 West from 11000 North until 11700 North 
should be 55 miles per hour unless an "engineering and 
traffic" study conducted by Utah County indicates that a 
lower speed is reasonable and safe. 
9. In my opinion, Utah County could lawfully alter the 
speed limit on 6000 West from its statutory prima facie 
speed only "on the basis of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under 
this article is not reasonable and safe under the 
conditions found to exist upon a highway or part of a 
highway." 
10. In my opinion, an "engineering and traffic 
investigation" must include a study of the normal and 
average speed of motorists using the road. 
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11. I have learned from my review of Utah County's 
Answers to Interrogatories on this matter that Utah 
County did not conduct a speed study or other engineering 
and traffic investigation prior to lowering the speed 
limit to 35 miles per hour on the portion of 6000 West 
where 6000 West intersects with 11500 North. 
12. I have personally examined the intersection at 6000 
West and 11500 North in Utah County where the accident 
occurred and, in connection with my examination of the 
Intersection, I performed a traffic engineering study in 
order to evaluate the safety of the intersection. In 
performing my traffic engineering study, I determined 
that the 85th percentile speed for vehicles traveling 
north on 6000 West is 48.1 mph and the 85th percentile 
speed for vehicles traveling south on 6000 West is 50.1 
mph. 
16. Thus, in my opinion, if Utah County had conducted a 
proper engineering and traffic investigation prior to the 
installation of the 35 miles per hour speed limit on 6000 
West, it would have discovered that corrective measures 
were needed to protect motorists using 6000 West from the 
hazard which existed due to the limited sight distance at 
the intersection of 6000 West and 11500 North. 
R. 683 (Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, ff 7, 9-12, 16). Mr. Guerts' 
testimony clearly establishes the link between Utah County's 
failure to conduct a traffic and engineering study and the 
accident. Utah County is free to dispute these conclusions with 
evidence, but the Utah Supreme Court's holdings prevent summary 
judgment for Utah County. Indeed, Utah County has never presented 
any evidence refuting the conclusions of Mr. Guerts. As such, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and before the trial court on 
remand, Plaintiff is the party eligible for summary judgment. 
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VI. 
UTAH COUNTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Utah County argues that even assuming all other elements of 
the Plaintiff's claim are established, summary judgment is 
appropriate because it did not cause the accident. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that "[p]roximate cause is a factual issue that 
generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law.. . . Because 
proximate cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from the 
jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 
infer causation." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P. 2d 97, 106 (Utah 
1992); see also Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 
(Utah 1993)("causation issues are factual issues that generally 
cannot be resolved as a matter of law.") 
Utah County argues that it implemented the "blind 
intersection" sign which Plaintifffs expert witness, C. Arthur 
Guerts, recommended, but this has failed to lower the speed of 
vehicles using 6000 West. It follows, argues Utah County, that even 
if the "blind intersection" sign had been in place at the time of 
the accident, the vehicles would have been going too fast and the 
accident still would have occurred. 
However, Utah County has only told this Court half the story. 
Mr. Guerts did testify that a "blind intersection" sign should be 
installed. However, he also testified: 
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19. In my opinion, the "blind intersection" sign is 
insufficient to protect motorists in that the blind 
intersection sign is not effective in reducing the speed 
of motorists travelling on 6000 West. 
20. In my opinion, Utah County should have identified the 
hazard associated with the intersection, provided 
corrective solutions, monitored the corrective solutions 
for effectiveness, and made necessary adjustments. These 
could include the blind intersection sign that was 
installed, "blind intersection" sign with flashers, or 
intersection flashers, or relocate the intersection to 
warn motorists using 6000 West of the intersection and 
the need for a reduction in speed. 
R. 683 (Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, ff 19-20). 
Moreover, in his deposition, Mr. Guerts testified as follows: 
Q. But what I mean, is you talked about signage. Are your 
talking about something like a blind intersection sign, 
or approaching blind intersection, or what? 
A. The blind intersection, I don't recall having ever 
seeing blind intersection as a sign in the MUTCD, but 
there certainly are signs that indicate intersection 
ahead, et cetera, and are applicable in this instance. 
And if they prove not to be adequate, then signs 
supplemented with flashers are a possibility, or a 
flasher itself over the intersection, all of which are 
corrective actions. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether a sign warning 
that you're approaching an intersection, or a sign 
warning you're approaching an intersection with flashers, 
or a flasher over the intersection, would have prevented 
the accident that brings us here today? 
A. There's no way of making an absolute determination on 
that. Do I believe it would have? I believe that properly 
evaluated, there would have been some corrective action 
and there was a high probability that the accident would 
have been prevented. 
Q. Some corrective action would have avoided the 
accident; is that correct? 
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A. Yes. 
(Deposition of C. Arthur Guerts, pp 65-66)(emphasis added). 
Mr. Guerts testified that if Utah County would have installed 
a "blind intersection" sign or a sign with flashers, or placed 
flashers over the Intersection, there was a high probability that 
this would have avoided the accident. Utah County now argues that 
it has installed the "blind intersection" sign and this has failed 
to reduce speeds along 6000 West. This fact alone would not allow 
this Court to assume that the other measures identified by Mr. 
Guerts—blind intersection sign with flashers or flashers—also 
would fail to reduce speeds along the road. 
Once again, the Butterfield and Nay standards are applicable. 
The fact that Mr. Guerts has identified measures which Utah County 
should have implemented and that these measures would have 
prevented the accident is sufficient to avoid summary judgment. 
Moreover, Utah County should be prevented from claiming that 
nothing could reduce the speeds along 6000 West when it has merely 
implemented the simplest of Mr. Guerts1 suggestions. 
Finally, it should be noted that Utah County has never 
disputed that a "blind intersection" sign with flashers or flashers 
above the intersection would have prevented the accident. Utah 
County has not presented one affidavit placing these facts into 
dispute. As such, these facts stand undisputed in favor of the 
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Plaintiff. If anyone is entitled to summary judgment upon remand, 
it is Plaintiff. 
VII. 
UTAH COUNTY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT 
Utah County^ final argument is that it is immune from suit 
because: (1) it failed to inspect 6000 West; and (2) its reliance 
on municipalities and others to insure the safety of its roads was 
a discretionary act. Neither of these contentions have merit. It is 
clear that Utah County has waived immunity because the failure to 
warn constituted a "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989). 
Utah County argues that its true failure in this matter was 
that it failed to inspect the road to discover the unsafe 
condition, and therefore, immunity is retained under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1)(d)(1989). However, in order for immunity to be 
retained, the injury must "arise out of" the failure to inspect. 
Id. Here, the injury arose out of the failure to warn of the 
dangerous Intersection, not the failure to inspect. 
Like Highland City in the consolidated portion of this 
appeal, Utah County readily concedes its negligence so long as it 
is immune from such allegations. This case is similar to Ingram v. 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). There, the plaintiff 
alleged that Salt Lake City negligently designed the placement of 
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a water meter lid, for which there was no immunity. Salt Lake City 
argued that it was really negligent in failing to inspect the water 
meter lid after installation, for which immunity could be retained. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Salt Lake City attempts to distinguish Murray and Bowen 
on the grounds that in the former, the plaintiff fell 
into a hole on the sidewalk and in the latter, the city's 
maintenance of a city street was at issue, whereas here 
the vault was not located on a public street. Both status 
and case law hold otherwise, and the city may not rely on 
section 63-30-10 (1) (d) of the Act to torture the facts of 
this case into the provisions of that section. 
Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
Here, Utah County failed to warn. This failure was the cause 
of the Plaintiff's injuries. It should not be allowed to torture 
the facts of this case to suggest that the injury "arises out of" 
Utah County's failure to inspect. 
The same arguments apply to Utah County's contentions that its 
true failure was relying upon municipalities and others to discover 
the hazard for it. As stated above, Utah County had a non-delegable 
duty to insure its roads were in a condition reasonably safe for 
travel. Utah County did not have discretion to rely upon these 
entities. It had to take care of the roads itself. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff was not injured when the 
municipalities failed to inform Utah County about the dangerous 
Intersection. The Plaintiff was injured when Utah County failed to 
warn motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous intersection. The 
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injury "arises out of" this failure to warn and not out of any 
action by those Utah County negligently relied upon to take care of 
Utah County's roads. 
Finally, Utah County argues that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(1989) does not apply to the instant case. That provision provides: 
Immunity from suit for all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or 
dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located thereon. 
Id. Utah County argues that this provision would not apply to a 
"complete failure to warn." Brief of Appellee, p. 30. Utah County 
lists several cases which have applied Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(1989) , but it has not provided one case which deals with a 
"complete failure to warn." 
Utah County's position creates a curious result. After all, 
Section 8 applies to a "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition 
of any highway" or other public structure. Utah County's argument 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that a "complete failure to 
warn" is not a "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." Taken to 
its extreme, if Utah County's road suddenly ends in a 200 foot drop 
into a river, assuring death, Utah County would argue that this is 
not a "defective, unsafe or dangerous" condition so long as Utah 
County provides a "complete failure to warn". Plaintiff has no way 
to respond to such a self-serving argument other than to suggest a 
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"complete failure to warn" of danger must be considered a 
"defective, unsafe or dangerous condition." It is difficult to 
imagine that the Legislature concluded that Section 8 would apply 
to all dangers on a road with the exception of a "complete failure 
to warn." One would expect that the Legislature would have at least 
included such a broad departure from common sense in the statute. 
Moreover, Utah County's cases cannot be reconciled with its 
position. Utah County explains that if it placed a warning sign on 
the road, but the sign was knocked down, such that there was a 
"complete failure to warn," Section 8 would apply. However, if it 
never placed a warning sign on the road, resulting in the very same 
"complete failure to warn," Section 8 would not apply. Utah 
County has not explained why a "complete failure to warn" due to a 
fallen sign is a "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition" but a 
"complete failure to warn" due to Utah County's negligence is not. 
Utah County's argument is ingenious and furthers its self-serving 
purpose of retaining immunity. However, Section 8 includes all 
"defective, unsafe or dangerous" conditions and thus, Utah County's 
argument should be rejected. 
Utah County also relies upon two cases to support its 
contentions. Valasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 
1970); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 
(Utah App. 1988). Both of these cases deal with railroad crossings 
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and the duty of a municipality to install traffic control devices. 
Againf there is a vast difference between a duty to install traffic 
control devices and a duty to warn. In the former, there is 
discretion. In the latter, there is not. Thus, these cases which do 
not deal with the duty to warn are simply inapplicable here and 
should not be relied upon. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that the summary judgment entered in favor of Utah County be 
overturned, and this matter remanded for trial. 
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